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Police Officers' Exercise of Discretion in the
Operation of Sobriety Checkpoints: The Need for
Predetermined, Objective Guidelines for a Safe,
Effective, and Constitutional Checkpoint:
Commonwealth v. Worthy
AUTOMOBILES-OFFENSES--PROSECUTION-ARREST, STOP, OR
INQUIRY; BAIL OR DEPOSIT-ROADBLOCK, CHECKPOINT, OR
ROUTINE OR RANDOM STOP-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that a police officer's exercise of discretion to temporarily
suspend a sobriety checkpoint to relieve traffic congestion is not in
conflict with the Tarbert guidelines and thus offends neither the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution nor Article
1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Commonwealth v. Worthy, 957 A.2d 720 (Pa. 2008)
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On-site police officers must operate a sobriety checkpoint' in
compliance with certain guidelines to ensure the roadblock is con-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution2 and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution.3 Officers determine the constitutionality by using a bal-
ancing test, which focuses on protecting the individual from arbi-
trary invasions at the unfettered discretion of officers. 4 These re-
quirements for a constitutional Driving Under the Influence
("DUI") roadblock were first adopted and applied by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in the landmark 1987 case Commonwealth
v. Tarbert.5 The issue of roadblock constitutionality has been ad-
dressed by the Pennsylvania courts since the time of Tarbert, in-
cluding the following cases: Commonwealth v. Fioretti,6 Com-
monwealth v. Blouse, Commonwealth v. Yastrop,7 Commonwealth
v. Beaman,8 In re J.A.K.,9 and most recently in Commonwealth v.
Worthy. 10
This Case Note examines Worthy's decision and its failure to
utilize the opportunity to remedy the problems established by
Tarbert's vague and arbitrary guidelines for law enforcement and
the courts. First, this Case Note will discuss the factual history of
Worthy." Next, this Case Note will present the procedural history
of Worthy, which will describe the decisions of the trial court and
Superior Court that the roadblock was unconstitutional due to the
exercise of unfettered discretion by the on-site officers, and the
1. In this case note, the terms "DUI roadblock" and "sobriety checkpoint" are used
interchangeably. See Commonwealth v. Beaman, 880 A.2d 578, 591 n.I. (Pa. 2005).
2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It requires law enforcement agents to use
a reasonable exercise of discretion, preventing "arbitrary invasions" of individuals' inter-
ests. Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Pa. 1987) (plurality opinion).
3. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[t]he people shall be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures." PA.
CONST. art. I, § 8. 10; WEST'S PA. PRAC. Driving Under the Influence § 8:4 (2010) (citing
Commonwealth v. Yastrop, 768 A.2d 318 (Pa. 2001)). Beaman, 880 A.2d at 581; See Com-
monwealth v. Blouse, 611 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa. 1992).
4. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1038-39 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)). See
infra Part V. A.
5. See infra Part V.
6. 538 A.2d 570 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
7. 768 A.2d 318, 323-24 (Pa. 2001).
8. 880 A.2d 578. (Pa. 2005).
9. 908 A.2d 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
10. Commonweatlh v. Worthy, 957 A.2d 720, 721 (Pa. 2008).
11. See infra Part II.
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decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to hear the ap-
peal. 12 This Case Note will then discuss the majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court. 13 Next, this Case
Note will discuss the precedent leading to Worthy, citing the
Pennsylvania line of Tarbert cases and a few cases from other ju-
risdictions addressing the same issue. 14 Finally, this Case Note
will analyze the decision of Worthy and its failure to provide de-
tailed and objective guidelines that law enforcement and future
courts could implement to minimize intrusion to individuals and
minimize potential litigation of this recurring and avoidable is-
sue.
15
II. THE FACTS OF WORTHY
On May 24, 2002, Sergeant Ronald Harvey and other police of-
ficers set up a sobriety checkpoint on State Route 22 in Monroe-
ville, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania as stipulated in the Mon-
roeville Police Department's memorandum of authorization (here-
inafter "administrative authority") from Assistant Chief Doug
Cole nine days earlier.16 Oncoming motorists could see the check-
point from "approximately one-half mile away."' 7
The officers stopped every vehicle, except those that came
through during three periods of traffic congestion, in which Ser-
geant Harvey had "temporarily suspend[ed] operation of the
checkpoint" and let every car through without stopping.18 Once
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part VI.
16. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 721. This route, also known as the William Penn Highway,
was selected because of the high number of motor vehicle accidents and arrests for viola-
tions of DUI statutes. Id. The memorandum provided as follows:
You are hereby authorized to post notice and arrange for officers to work a sobriety
checkpoint the night of the 24th of May, 2002. The checkpoint details shall start at
2300 hours, the 24th of May, 2002, and conclude no later than 0400 hours on the 25th
of May, 2002. As per our conversation on the 15th of May, 2002[;] our review of the
state accident statistics regarding drinking and driving accidents[;] and our depart-
ment records showing the number of traffic stops resulting in driving under the in-
fluence arrests, you are authorized to set up a checkpoint on Route 22 westbound at
Roomful Express, 3651 William Penn Highway in Monroeville, Pa. If circumstances
would prevent you from using that primary location you are authorized to move to
2420 Moss Side Boulevard, State Route 48 in Monroeville.
Id. at 721-22.
17. Id. at 722. The Court stated that the area of the checkpoint was designated by,
"large orange signs, illuminated with traffic flares and lights several hundred feet in ad-




the "unreasonable delay" from the traffic decreased, the officers
restarted the checkpoint and stopped every vehicle again. 19
Officers at this checkpoint stopped the vehicle of Appellee Mark
S. Worthy (hereinafter "Worthy").20 The officer arrested Worthy,
after the officer observed Worthy exhibit signs of intoxication, 21
fail three field sobriety tests, and fail a breathalyzer test, charging
him with two counts of DUI. 22 The facts of this matter were of
first impression, and therefore were not in dispute.23
III. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF WORTHY
Worthy filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress evidence
acquired from the checkpoint. 24 Worthy claimed that his rights to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under both the
United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution
25
were violated as a result of the stop. 26 Worthy contended that the
officers were granted "unfettered discretion" in stopping and start-
ing vehicles, because the administrative authority did not specify
the grounds on which the officers should operate such a check-
point.27 The discretion used in the temporary suspensions con-
flicts with the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of




20. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 722.
21. Id. Worthy exhibited bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol.
Id. Worthy was charged under 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(1) (1987) (repealed and
replaced by 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 3802 (2003)), for driving under the influence of alco-
hol to a degree that rendered the person incapable of driving safely, and 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3731(a)(4)(i) (1987) (repealed and replaced by 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 3802
(2003)), for driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.10% or greater. Id. at 722 n.1.
22. Id.
23. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 721.
24. Id. at 722.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 722.
28. 535 A.2d 1035 (Pa. 1987).
29. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 722. The Tarbert guidelines are as follows:
[T]he conduct of the roadblock itself can be such that it requires only a momentary
stop to allow the police to make a brief but trained observation of a vehicle's driver,
without entailing any physical search of the vehicle or its occupants. To avoid unnec-
essary surprise to motorists, the existence of a roadblock can be so conducted as to be
ascertainable from a reasonable distance or otherwise made knowable in advance.
The possibility of arbitrary roadblocks can be significantly curtailed by the institu-
tion of certain safeguards. First, the very decision to hold a drunk-driver roadblock,
as well as the decision as to its time and place, should be matters reserved for prior
administrative approval, thus removing the determination of those matters from the
548 Vol. 49
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The trial court granted Worthy's motion to suppress evidence
and decided that "[t]he authority to conduct the checkpoint [as
granted in the Memorandum of Authority] did not include author-
ity to suspend the checkpoint when traffic backed-up."30 The trial
court explicated that the checkpoint did not comply with the Tar-
bert guidelines because the on-site officers had broad control in
deciding when to suspend the checkpoint due to traffic congestion,
since there was no pre-established criteria issued to guide them. 31
The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed
the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence on the grounds
that the decision to temporarily stop and restart the checkpoint
was made "by the arbitrary and unfettered discretion" of the on-
scene officers instead of a pre-fixed and objective standard, as the
Tarbert guidelines require.32 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal to
address whether the Superior Court and the trial court erred in
affirming suppression on the grounds that the memorandum did
not provide guidance for temporary suspension of the checkpoint
resulting from traffic.
33
IV. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IN WORTHY
A. Justice McCaffery's Majority Opinion
Justice McCaffery authored the majority opinion, which provid-
ed the court's ultimate holding that the on-site police officers' use
of discretion to temporarily stop and then restart the operation of
the checkpoint due to traffic did not violate the Tarbert guidelines
discretion of police officers in the field. In this connection it is essential that the
route selected for the roadblock be one which, based on local experience, is likely to be
travelled by intoxicated drivers. The time of the roadblock should be governed by the
same consideration. Additionally, the question of which vehicles to stop at the road-
block should not be left to the unfettered discretion of police officers at the scene, but
instead should be in accordance with objective standards prefixed by administrative
decision.
Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1043.
30. Id,
31. Id.
32. Commonwealth v. Worthy, 903 A.2d 576, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). Justice Todd
filed a concurring opinion in which she explained that Tarbert and Blouse provide a limited
exception to the constitutional requirement of probable cause for a seizure that "may be
allowed only under the most exacting standards." Worthy, 903 A.2d at 581 (Todd, J., con-
curring). Justice Todd ultimately concluded the need for pre-fixed standards to determine
which vehicles to stop was not met in the case at hand. Id.
33. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 723 (Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion).
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or the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions. 34 Justice
McCaffery set forth five similar criteria to those established in
Tarbert that must be met in order to have a constitutional check-
point under the Pennsylvania Constitution.35 The factor relevant
to the issue at hand, the fifth criterion, required administrative
conditions to be predetermined, so that the on-site officers were
not left on their own with the judgment call of stopping and start-
ing the checkpoint.3 6 Justice McCaffery agreed with Justice Ea-
kin's concurrence to the extent that officers do not have to meet
each and every criterion of the Tarbert guidelines, but rather must
substantially comply37 with its guidelines.
38
The majority disagreed with the inference of the appeals and
trial court, that the officers exercised "unfettered discretion" in
deciding which vehicles to stop without established authority. 39
Justice McCaffery emphasized that the decision to suspend and
resume the checkpoint was not based on the drivers' characteris-
tics or conduct, as evidenced by the fact that "every vehicle was
stopped" by the officers while the checkpoint was operating and
then "every vehicle [was allowed] to pass through" without stop-
ping while the checkpoint was suspended. 40 The court made the
distinction, that while Sergeant Harvey did exercise his discretion
in deciding to suspend the checkpoint based on his "trained obser-
vation" that the traffic volume was so heavy that it caused unrea-
sonable delay, neither he nor any officer exercised discretion re-
garding which vehicles to stop.4' Justice McCaffery further ex-
34. Id. at 727.
35. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 725.The five criteria included:
(1) vehicle stops must be brief and must not entail a physical search; (2) there must
be sufficient warning of the existence of the checkpoint; (3) the decision to conduct a
checkpoint, as well as the decisions as to time and place for the checkpoint, must be
subject to prior administrative approval; (4) the choice of time and place for the
checkpoint must be based on local experience as to where and when intoxicated driv-
ers are likely to be traveling; and (5) the decision as to which vehicles to stop at the
checkpoint must be established by administratively pre-fixed, objective standards,
and must not be left to the unfettered discretion of the officers at the scene.
Id.
36. Id. at 725.
37. The majority explained that substantial compliance, not complete compliance, "with
the guidelines is all that is required to reduce the intrusiveness of the search to a constitu-
tionally acceptable level." Id. at 725. Justice Eakin clarified in his concurrence that "[i]If
all five factors must be met, this would be "complete compliance" with the guidelines, not
merely "substantial compliance" as Blouse requires." Id. at 729 (Eakin, J., concurring).
38. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 725.
39. Id. at 725-26
40. Id. at 726. (emphasis in original).
41. Id.
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plained that officers have the authority to exercise sufficient dis-
cretion, not unfettered discretion, on the scene to allow them to
fulfill their responsibilities. 42 The majority concluded that the op-
eration and suspension of this sobriety checkpoint did not violate
the Tarbert guidelines's requirement of pre-established stand-
ards. 43
B. Chief Justice Castille's Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Castille filed a concurring opinion to express addi-
tional reasons why Worthy's motion to suppress evidence from the
stop at the checkpoint should not have been granted. 44 He opined
that the existing rule is incomplete and the police acted in good
faith. 45 Chief Justice Castille further explained that the Tarbert
guidelines were adopted to address limited situations, not includ-
ing the one at issue.46 Chief Justice Castille agreed with Justice
Saylor's dissent, insofar as admitting that the case at hand
showed that traffic back up always would be a foreseeable condi-
tion of a sobriety checkpoint and that there should be a provision
from the administrative authority addressing the issue.47 As dis-
tinguished from Justice Saylor's opinion, however, Chief Justice
Castille noted that suppression was proper because the police fol-
lowed the Tarbert guidelines and made rational decisions when
faced with an event not considered by the guidelines. 48
C. Justice Eakin's Concurring Opinion
Justice Eakin filed a separate concurring opinion to clarify that
the Tarbert guidelines should be construed as specific criteria that
courts ought to consider in every case rather than those that are
required to apply.49 Justice Eakin disagreed with the majority's
42. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 726. Justice McCaffery explained that contrary to the Superior
Court's reasoning, the fact that the memorandum authorizing the checkpoint did not in-
clude a sentence providing the police with discretion to suspend the checkpoint does not
distinguish it from Commonwealth v. Fioretti, in which the court held a checkpoint consti-
tutional where "the only discretion exercised by the police would be in deciding whether to
discontinue the checkpoint if the traffic backed up." Id. at 727 (citing Commonwealth v.
Fioretti, 538 A.2d 570, 577 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
43. Worthy, 957 A.2d. at 727.




48. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 728 (Castille, C.J., concurring).
49. Id. (Eakin, J., concurring).
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conclusion that each guideline must be met with "substantial
compliance," 50 as defined by the majority. Instead, Justice Eakin
contended that the constitutionality of the checkpoint should be
based on the "totality of the circumstances." 51
D. Justice Saylor's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Saylor dissented on the grounds that the Constitution
requires pre-existing guidelines in order to make the decision of
temporarily suspending and restarting a checkpoint because of
traffic.52 He pointed out that the guidelines upon which the ma-
jority relied were intended to prevent the use of discretion that
may cause problems in random traffic stops and to assure the in-
evitable examination of discretion exercised by the officers.
53
While Justice Saylor did not believe that the administrative au-
thority for the sobriety checkpoint should stipulate what to do in
every possible event, he did contend that it should address those
events that are foreseeable, such as traffic congestion.54 Justice
Saylor opined that suspend or resume guidelines established be-
fore the checkpoint would not only protect drivers' constitutional
rights, but would also address the majority's concerns of on-site
officers being able to maintain safety and allow for only reasona-
ble delay.55 Justice Saylor reasoned that because the officers ex-
ceeded the administrative authority and used unfettered discre-
tion to decide when to suspend and resume the checkpoint, the
final criterion of the Tarbert guidelines was not satisfied.
56
Justice Saylor further explained that, contrary to Justice Ea-
kin's concurrence, case law requires that the checkpoint satisfy
each guideline to meet the substantial compliance requirement.
57
Justice Saylor also voiced his disagreement with the Common-
wealth's contention that an unconstitutional search demands sup-
pression. 58 Justice Saylor made clear that courts in the Common-
50. Id.
51. Id. at 729.
52. Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting). Justice Baer joined this dissent. Id. at 733.
53. Worthy, 957 A.2d. at 730 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 730-31.
56. Id. at 731.
57. Id. at 731-32. See Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1180.
58. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 733 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
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wealth of Pennsylvania are supposed to suppress evidence that
was obtained as the result of such a search.
59
Justice Saylor opined that the Tarbert guidelines relate to how a
driver is stopped, and to how a checkpoint is conducted in line
with objective criteria under the United States Constitution.
60
Because Justice Saylor believed Worthy was not stopped at a
checkpoint that complied with such pre-existing guidelines, he
would have affirmed the Superior Court's holding that Worthy's
constitutional rights were violated. 6'
V. THE PRECEDENT LEADING TO WORTHY
A. Commonwealth v. Tarbert and the Institution of the Guide-
lines in Pennsylvania
The guidelines for a constitutional DUI roadblock were first
adopted and applied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the
1987 case Commonwealth v. Tarbert,62 in which the court disposed
of consolidated appeals of the Superior Court's orders to suppress
evidence of drunk driving obtained from DUI roadblocks because
the roadblocks were found to be unlawful.63 In Tarbert, police es-
tablished a roadblock to check all drivers traveling in both direc-
tions in a location chosen due to its high incidence of motor vehicle
accidents and arrests for violations of the DUI statutes.64 A police
officer stopped each vehicle, asked to see the driver's license and
registration, and looked for signs of intoxication. 65 An officer
asked Tarbert to pull over after the officer sensed an odor of alco-
59. Id. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ruey, 892 A.2d 802, 808 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Gordon, 683 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa. 1996)).
60. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 733 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. 535 A.2d 1035, 1043 (Pa. 1987).
63. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1043. At the time of the roadblocks in Tarbert, as explained
below by Driving Under the Influence, supra note 3, § 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code did not
yet allow systematic motor vehicle checks:
Although Tarbert upheld the constitutionality of drunk-driver roadblocks, it never-
theless held that because the 1983 version of § 6308(b) was in effect at the time of the
disputed stops, the police lacked statutory authority to engage in systematic vehicle
stops, but required 'articulable and reasonable grounds' to suspect a Vehicle Code vi-
olation prior to making the stop. Accordingly, although the motorists' constitutional
rights had not been violated, the checkpoints were still illegal because of an absence
of specific statutory authority to engage in such activity. Had the checkpoints been
conducted under the current version of § 6308, the Court's determination most likely
would have been different.
Driving Under the Influence, supra note 3 (footnotes omitted).




hol from the car and observed other signs of intoxication, as well
as an open beer bottle near Tarbert's seat.66 Tarbert was arrested
and later charged and convicted of drunk driving after failing two
of three field sobriety tests and providing a breath sample that
yielded a blood alcohol content reading of 0.12%.67 The Superior
Court reversed the judgment of Tarbert's sentence for driving un-
der the influence after finding the roadblock unconstitutional.
68
In the companion case, Commonwealth v. Dannaker, III, police
established a roadblock, stopping motorists in groups of three.
6 9
Dannaker, one such motorist, was asked to step out from his vehi-
cle after officers observed signs of intoxication. 70 Officers arrested
Dannaker and administered a breath test, which yielded a 0.11%
blood alcohol content reading. 71 The trial court granted his motion
to suppress the test results, and the Superior Court affirmed.
7 2
Chief Justice Nix wrote the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's plu-
rality opinion, which was joined by Justice McDermott.73 The plu-
rality adopted a balancing test to determine the constitutionality
of a roadblock, weighing the state's interest in the safety and wel-
fare of its citizens from drunk drivers against a checkpoint's inva-
sive nature. 74 The plurality applied this balancing test and con-
cluded that the roadblocks are constitutional if carried out in sub-
stantial compliance with certain guidelines.7 5 These guidelines
provide a means to manage and operate a checkpoint in a manner
66. Id.
67. Id. The relevant statutory language is as follows:
An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement
of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concen-
tration in the individual's blood or breath is at least 0.08% but less than 0.10% within
two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control
of the movement of the vehicle.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3802(a)(2) (West 2006).
68. Tarbert, 535 A.2d. at 1036.
69. Id. at 1036-37.
70. Id. Dannaker exhibited signs of intoxication including bloodshot eyes and an odor
of alcohol on his breath. Id. at 1037.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1035.
74. Id. at 1041-43. The balancing test is derived from Brown v. Texas, in which the
reviewing court weighed "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the de-
gree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty." Beaman, 880 A.2d at 582 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50
(1979)). This balancing test was first used by a court when a roadblock used to detect ille-
gal aliens at the border was at issue in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. State v. Downey,
945 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. 1997) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976)).
75. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1043.
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that is constitutional and less intrusive. 76 Predetermined authori-
ty regarding the actual operation of the sobriety checkpoint is nec-
essary to remove the exercise of discretion of on-site officers.
77
The checkpoint should be held at a location and time where and
when drunk driving is most common. 78 In addition, the adminis-
trative authority should provide objective conditions that guide
officers in making the decision of which vehicles to stop.79 Be-
cause the roadblock at issue did not comply with the guidelines, it
was deemed unconstitutional.
80
Justices Papadakos and Zapalla filed concurring opinions.
81
Both Justice Papadakos and Justice Zappalla agreed with the plu-
rality's conclusion that the roadblock was improper due to the of-
ficer's failure to operate it according to the predetermined instruc-
tion.82 Justice Papadakos concurred because he believed the court
should not have addressed the constitutional issues.8 3 Justice Za-
palla disagreed with the court's constitutional analysis.8 4 He
found the roadblock unconstitutional since it lacked probable
cause, a constitutional pre-requisite for such seizures.8 5 Justice
Zapalla explained that he must disagree with the majority's adop-
tion of the later-rejected majority decision in United States v.
Place,8 6 which applied the balancing test to validate the operation
of the checkpoint.
87
While Justice Larsen dissented because he would have reversed
the Superior Court's order of no statutory bar to systematic check-
points, he agreed with Chief Justice Nix's conclusion that the





80. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1045.
81. Id. Justice Flaherty concurred in the result without filing an opinion. Id.
82. Id. at 1045, 1047.
83. Id. at 1047 (Papadakos, J., concurring).
84. Id.
85. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1047.
86. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
87. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1046 (Zapalla, J., concurring). The majority addressed Justice
Zappalla's rejection of the balancing-of-interests approach and explained that such a police
roadblock, like the one at hand, is a situation in which the requirement of probable cause is
inappropriate. Id. at 1039 n.1 (majority opinion). The court explained, "[i]t must be
stressed that the absence of the requirement of an individualized finding of probable cause
or reasonable suspicion does not reflect an arbitrary intrusion upon the privacy of individu-
als" because it is offset by "the nature of the evil [i.e. improper use of motor vehicle] sought
to be addressed." Id.
88. Id. at 1047-48 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
555Summer 2011
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justice joined the Tarbert opinion in full, four of the six participat-
ing justices agreed that systematic roadblocks are constitutional.8 9
B. Application of Tarbert in Pennsylvania
One year after Tarbert, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ap-
plied the Tarbert guidelines in Commonwealth v. Fioretti.90 In
Fioretti, the roadblock at issue was set-up according to the loca-
tion's safety features and statistics that showed the times and
places of the most frequent drunk driving accidents and arrests. 91
The police operated the checkpoint in line with a pre-approved
written procedure, and stopped every car heading east.
92
The Fioretti court held the checkpoint to be constitutional, be-
cause it satisfied the Tarbert guidelines, given that the on-site po-
lice officers conducted themselves in compliance with the written
procedure that gave them the authority to stop every car heading
east with the discretion to decide whether to suspend the check-
point if the traffic backed up.93 Judge Montemuro, who authored
the opinion, concluded that potential discretion by on-site officers
in deciding to temporarily suspend the checkpoint due to traffic
was removed by the stopping of every car. 
94
In 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Blouse,95 adopted the Tarbert guidelines as applicable to all "sys-
tematic, nondiscriminatory, nonarbitrary roadblocks" set up to
detect license, registration, and equipment violations. 96 In Blouse,
the roadblock was held at a location based on a high number of
these violations, properly authorized, and included sufficient
warning to motorists.
97
The court recognized the roadblock stop as a seizure and focused
on whether it was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of
89. Beaman, 880 A.2d at 584-85 (quoting Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1179). "rhe views of
Chief Justice Nix, Mr. Justice McDermott, Mr. Justice Papadakos, and myself [Mr. Justice
Larsen], as expressed in the Tarbert decision are evidence of this Courts willingness to
uphold the constitutionality of systematic roadblocks." Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1179 n.2.
90. 538 A.2d 570 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
91. Id. at 576.
92. Id. at 577.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 576.
95. 611 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1992).
96. Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1180. "In applying Tarbert to the case sub judice, the rationale
behind upholding the constitutionality of drunk driving roadblocks applies equally to all
systematic roadblocks .. " Id. at 1179.
97. Id. at 1180.
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the United States Constitution.98 The majority relied heavily on
the Tarbert opinion in determining the reasonableness of the
roadblock.99 The majority focused on whether a person's "reason-
able expectation of privacy" was exposed to the invasiveness re-
sulting from on-site officers' exercise of unfettered discretion. 100
Using the same balancing test as applied in Tarbert, the court in
Blouse weighed the intrusion upon an individual by a "systematic,
nondiscriminatory, nonarbitrary" roadblock against the Common-
wealth's interest in the safety of its highways. 10 1 Because the de-
gree of intrusion of the systematic roadblock was offset by the
state's significant interest in the safety of its roads, the court con-
cluded that such a roadblock was reasonable under Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
0 2
Justices McDermott and Papadakos joined Justice Larsen's ma-
jority opinion, along with Chief Justice Nix. 103 Justice Papadakos
filed a concurring opinion to draw attention to the potential of the
police officers' ability to abuse their authority while conducting
these roadblocks. 10 4 Justice Flaherty filed a dissent to explain the
requirement of probable cause, since a roadblock is a "seizure" un-
der the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 5 Justice Flaherty disagreed
with the majority's reasoning that the balancing test could be ap-
plied to a checkpoint based on less than probable cause, as it
would otherwise impede achievement of the goal of protecting citi-
zens from drunk drivers.10 6 He further explained that the balanc-
ing test was applied in Johnston only after the court determined
the search was permissible based on the officers' explanation of
reasonable grounds for suspecting drug activity. 107 Probable cause
is always a requirement under Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution, and the circumstances in Blouse provided no
exception to Justice Flaherty.108 Justice Flaherty conversely as-
serted that although the Johnston court conducted a balancing
test to determine whether the search was constitutional, it deter-
98. Id. at 1178.
99. Id. at 1180.




104. Id. at 1181 (Papadakos, J., concurring).
105. Blouse, 611 A.2d at1182 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Justices Zappalla and Cappy
joined in this dissent. Id. at 1182.
106. Id. at 1179 (majority opinion).
107. Id. at 1181 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1181-82.
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mined that the search was reasonable and thus permissible be-
cause it was based on probable cause.10 9 Justice Zappalla filed a
dissent that similarly explained the Article I, Section 8 require-
ment of probable cause before applying the balancing test.11 Jus-
tice Zappalla reiterated his discontent with checkpoints from his
earlier dissent in Tarbert.111
Five years after Blouse, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
again found that because the Tarbert guidelines were met, the
checkpoint at issue in Commonwealth v. Pacek"2 was constitu-
tional, while addressing whether notice of a checkpoint was suffi-
cient.113 In Pacek, even though on-site officers stopped and started
the checkpoint three or four times due to traffic congestion, the
majority still determined that the officers' decision of which vehi-
cles to stop complied with the Tarbert guidelines and created a
constitutional roadblock.
1 14
In the 2001 case, Commonwealth v. Yastrop,"5 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania explained they would affirm the trial
court's decision that the DUI roadblock was constitutional, as long
as the roadblock substantiality complied with the Tarbert guide-
lines and the decision was premised on sufficient evidence of rec-
ord. 16 The roadblock at issue in Yastrop was authorized, notice of
its operation was given, and the location was one where drunk
driving accidents had occurred and where officers had made ar-
rests for DUI in the past.1 7 Specifically, officers stopped each ve-
hicle and conducted field-sobriety tests when they sensed an odor
of alcohol in accordance with prefixed authority."l8 In line with
the procedure, officers stopped Yastrop and conducted a field test
once the smell of alcohol was detected. 19 Yastrop failed the tests
and was arrested.120
Justice Newman, joined by Justice Castille, a two-justice plural-
ity, similar to the plurality in Tarbert, concluded that there re-
mained no constitutional barrier to DUI roadblocks under Article
109. Id. at 1181-82 (quoting Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79).
110. Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1183 (Zappalla, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Zappalla, J., dissenting).
112. 691 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
113. Pacek, 691 A.2d at 471.
114. Id. at 468 n.2.
115. 768 A.2d 318, 323-24 (Pa. 2001).
116. Yastrop, 768 A.2d at 319.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 319-20 & n.3.




1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 121 The court broad-
ened Blouse's analysis regarding registration, licensing, and
equipment roadblocks to sobriety checkpoints, increasing its au-
thoritative weight to that of Tarbert.
122
Justice Cappy concurred and expressed his concern that road-
blocks would not satisfy the "compelling state interest" any better
than law enforcement's standard procedures. 123 Recognizing that
Justice Newman was unable to address the inevitable issue re-
garding law enforcement's intent to continue using general
searches, he joined in the majority's result and in Justice Saylor's
concurrence. 24 Justice Saylor concurred with the plurality's deci-
sion, despite his belief that sobriety roadblocks lack effectiveness,
because he thought the case at hand was not the appropriate
means of overturning Tarbert and Blouse.
125
Justice Flaherty dissented, acknowledging the hazard of drunk
drivers while emphasizing the need to still apply the constitution-
al restraint of probable cause to sobriety checkpoints.126 He goes
as far as stating that Blouse should be overruled, as it upheld the
use of a roadblock, which allows officers to stop vehicles without
probable cause, to somehow enforce the motor vehicle code, which
no longer requires "articulable and reasonable grounds" for a
stop. 27 He notes that a checkpoint's infringement on the security
and privacy of Pennsylvania citizens is more important than the
efficiency of law enforcement that results from its use.12 Another
dissent was filed by Justice Nigro and joined by Justice Zapalla, in
which Justice Nigro expressed his disagreement with the majori-
ty's conclusion that sobriety checkpoints are essential to officers'
prevention of drunk driving. 129 Justice Nigro contended that there
are methods available that simultaneously increase effectiveness
and decrease restrictiveness when protecting individuals from
drunk drivers. Justice Nigro's dissent maintained that if the ma-
jority correctly estimated the intrusion to motorists, it would out-
121. Yastrop, 768 A.2d at 319.
122. Id. at 322-23.
123. Id. at 324-25 (Cappy, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 325.
125. Id. at 325 (Saylor, J., concurring).
126. Yastrop, 768 A.2d at 326 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 328.
128. Id.
129. Id. (Nigro, J., dissenting).
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weigh the Commonwealth's interest to keep drunk drivers off of
the road. 130
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth
v. Beaman,131 like the court in Yastrop, re-affirmed the notion that
it is proper to apply the balancing test to constitutional challenges
to systematic roadblocks. 132  The appellant in Beaman was
stopped at a sobriety checkpoint and charged with two counts of
DUI. 133 Basing his appeal on the grounds that the balancing test
should not have been applied, he argued that the balancing test is
only appropriate where there are no other feasible options for a
stop without probable cause. 134 The appellant explained that rov-
ing patrols 135 are more effective than roadblocks creating an alter-
native, the existence of which prevents the application of the bal-
ancing test.13 6 The court disagreed and affirmed the idea that so-
briety checkpoints are constitutional, further explaining the no-
tion that roving police patrols were more efficient than roadblocks
in reducing drunk driving and did not affect the constitutional
validity of roadblocks.13
7
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in the 2006 case of In re
J.A.K.138 held that the traffic safety roadblock was constitutional
because the officers conducted the roadblock in compliance with
the prefixed standard of the administrative authority. 139 The
written guidelines included such instructions as to stop every
third car, to check restraint usage, and to check the vehicle opera-
tor's license, registration, and insurance.140
C. Other Jurisdictions'Determinations of Constitutional Road-
blocks
Other jurisdictions have addressed the issue of a constitutional
roadblock as well. In the 1997 Tennessee case, State v. Downey,' 41
officers either stopped vehicles or let every vehicle pass dependent
130. Yastrop, 768 A.2d at 329.
131. 880 A.2d 578 (Pa. 2005).
132. Beaman, 880 A.2d at 587.
133. Id. at 586.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 580. A roving DUI patrol requires police officers patrolling roadways for
drunk drivers to have probable cause before stopping a vehicle. Id. at 581 n.3.
136. Beaman, 880 A.2d at 586.
137. Id. at 587-88.
138. 908 A.2d 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
139. In re J.AK., 908 A.2d at 326-27.
140. Id.
141. 945 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1997).
560 Vol. 49
Commonwealth v. Worthy
on traffic.142 The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Downey held
that the roadblock was unconstitutional after explaining that mat-
ters of time, place, and which vehicles to stop should be in compli-
ance with the administrative authority's pre-established stand-
ards, and "should not be left to the unfettered discretion of the
officers at the scene. 143
Similarly, in 2002, the Indiana Supreme Court in State v.
Gerschoffer 144 applied comparable guidelines to those in Tarbert
and held a roadblock was unconstitutional when officers were
found to have exercised a great degree of discretion due to the lack
of authority on how each officer should approach and screen mo-
torists. 145
VI. THE FAILURE OF WORTHY
Justice Zappalla's concurrence in Tarbert revealed great fore-
sight when he characterized the court's majority opinion as creat-
ing "what is perceived to be a constitutionally sound legislative
scheme for establishing roadblocks."'146 This perception has not
survived contact with reality in Pennsylvania, as evidenced by the
contention in cases such as Blouse, Yastrop, and, most recently,
Worthy. The court in Tarbert set forth guidelines, with the pur-
pose of establishing objective procedures, to protect an individual's
right to be free from arbitrary intrusions pursuant to the United
States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution. 147 How-
ever, the guidelines' arbitrary and vague language proved prob-
lematic to police and courts attempting to define and approach the
issue of constitutional roadblocks.
After Tarbert, law enforcement officers and the courts still did
not have definite and clear rules by which to operate or review a
142. Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 105.
143. Id. at 110-11 (citing Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1043).
144. 763 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 2002).
145. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d at 969. The court considered the following factors:
(1) whether the roadblock was staged pursuant to a formal, neutral plan approved by
appropriate officials; (2) the objective, location, and timing of the checkpoint, taking
these factors into account to determine whether the seizure was well calculated to ef-
fectuate its purpose; (3) the amount of discretion exercised by field officers conducting
the checkpoint, with a goal of minimal discretion to ensure against arbitrary or in-
consistent actions by the screening officers; (4) degree of intrusion and whether the
roadblock was avoidable; (5) whether the surrounding conditions of the checkpoint
were safe; and (6) whether the checkpoint was effective.
Id. at 967-70.
146. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1046 (Zappalla, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1043.
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roadblock. The court in Worthy had the opportunity to provide a
solution to the very problem that Tarbert presented, and it failed
to do so. After Worthy, "discretion" was still undefined, leaving
courts to determine its meaning on a case-by-case basis. The ma-
jority in Worthy left no opportunity for a consistent interpretation
and implementation of its opinion by future courts or law en-
forcement. Justice Castille explained the problem succinctly in
his concurrence: "What this case reveals, more than anything
else, is an unavoidable deficiency in the constitutional rules courts
are called upon to fashion."
148
This deficiency was recognized and addressed by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") and Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police ("IACP") in September 2004,
more than four years before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's
decision in Worthy, through their publication of guidelines to aid
police administrators in executing legal, effective, and safe sobrie-
ty checkpoints. 149 These guidelines suggest that officers should
develop a procedure that ensures constitutional protections to mo-
torists who are stopped.1 50 The guidelines further suggest imple-
menting a system that complies with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Delaware v. Prousel51 by ensuring that every
car has an equal chance of being selected.1 52 This could be done by
either stopping every vehicle, or by stopping every tenth or every
twentieth vehicle so that the officer does not exercise individual
discretion in deciding which vehicle is to be stopped. 15 3
Pennsylvania case law supports the NHTSA and IACP's conten-
tion that compliance with these suggestions will result in a consti-
tutional roadblock in most jurisdictions. This is evidenced by cas-
es involving roadblocks in which all vehicles were stopped in a
systematic fashion, which significantly reduced, if not eliminated,
the discretion of on-site officers, and, in turn, the subjective intru-
148. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 728 (Castille, C.J., concurring).
149. INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, HIGHWAY SAFETY DESK BOOK, 5-11:5-14 (Sept.
2004), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/enforce/deskbk.html.
150. Id.
151. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse, the Court stated that "the essential purpose of the
proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon
the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in
order 'to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."'
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54 (citations and footnote omitted).
152. INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 153.
153. INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 153.
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sion.15 4 Cases such as In re J.A.K. illustrate the effective applica-
tion of predetermined, objective standards like those suggested by
the NHTSA and IACP, as it held that the traffic safety roadblock
was constitutional because the officers conducted the roadblock in
compliance with the prefixed standards, such as stopping every
third car. 155 If courts mandated and police administration en-
forced such guidelines for the operation of roadblocks, officers
would operate a consistent and non-arbitrary roadblock. Such a
roadblock would leave little room for the argument that police of-
ficers' exercise of discretion rendered the roadblock unconstitu-
tional, thereby greatly reducing litigation of the matter.
The attorneys' briefs and the court's opinion in Worthy failed to
cite any persuasive case law on these national guidelines. As Jus-
tice Saylor explained, the majority "missed the point" in finding it
not determinative whether the administrative authorization failed
to include a sentence providing police with the discretion to sus-
pend the checkpoint if traffic backed-up. 156 The majority is correct
in explaining that such "general language does not provide any
real guidance or delineate any relevant factors to aid in the exer-
cise of the granted discretion[;]' 157 however, this statement illus-
trated the need for specific instructions, more explicit than those
of Tarbert. Such detailed guidelines would prevent the exercise of
unlawful discretion to officers while preserving their need for le-
gitimate on-scene discretion.
Justice Saylor wisely asserted the belief, shared by the majority
of other courts, 58 that the administrative authorization for future
roadblocks should include provisions about foreseeable contingen-
cies, such as traffic back-up, and must be set up in accordance
154. See State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (Kan. 1983) (roadblock was constitutional
where every car was stopped); Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (Md. 1984) (same); People
v. Scott, 473 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 1984) (same). Contra State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court
of State, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (roadblocks were unconstitutional because they were set up at
the discretion of a local highway patrolman and were operated without specific directions or
guidelines).
155. In re J.A.K., 908 A.2d at 327.
156. 957 A.2d at 730 n.1 (Saylor, J. dissenting).
157. Id. at 727 n.8.
158. See Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d at 969 (finding the roadblock unreasonable because on-
site officers were not given standardized guidelines for its operation); Crouch v. Common-
wealth, 494 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Va. App. 1997) (stating the established principle of Virginia
that the discretion of on-site officers be limited through predetermined procedures and
objective standards); State v. Sigler, 687 S.E.2d 391, 403 (W. Va. 2009) (stating "suspicion-
less checkpoint roadblocks are constitutional in West Virginia only when conducted in a
random and non-discriminatory manner within predetermined written operation guidelines
which minimize the State's intrusion into the freedom of the individual and which strictly
limits the discretion vested in police officers at the scene").
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with objective criteria, operated in a manner that minimizes in-
trusiveness and the discretion of officers. 159 The implementation
of such requirements would properly limit the discretion from law
enforcement and save a great deal of time and money spent on
litigation of the matter. In litigation, officers' use of discretion
strengthens the argument of a defendant stopped at a checkpoint,
while the majority of courts continue to presume an abuse of that
discretion unless the state can prove otherwise.160
The plurality in Tarbert and the majority in Worthy both recog-
nized the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section
8 requirement to impose a "reasonableness" standard on law en-
forcement agents' exercise of discretion. 161 Nonetheless, neither
provided enough clarity to ensure such safeguards that protect
individuals from arbitrary invasions. To compare, the Indiana
Supreme Court in State v. Gerschoffer explained that because the
state did provide sufficient guidance "to ensure against arbitrary
intrusions or inconsistent actions by the screening officers," such
failure weighed heavily against the reasonableness of the road-
block. 162 This holding in Gerschoffer is consistent with the holding
of the Superior Court in Worthy,163 which should have been af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. By affirming the
Superior Court's decision that the roadblock was unconstitutional
due to the high level of discretion exercised by the officers, the
court would have issued an opinion that would successfully ensure
the safeguards both the United States Constitution as well as the
Pennsylvania Constitution seek to protect. It would also provide
a clear answer to officers and courts: that discretion outside the
bounds of the pre-determined and administrative authority will
most likely lead to a finding of an unconstitutional roadblock.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in In re J.A.K, after holding
that the roadblock was constitutional because the officers con-
ducted the roadblock in compliance with the pre-determined
standard of the administrative authority, and thus the Tarbert
159. Worthy, 957 A.2d at 730. Chief Justice Castille agreed with this notion. Id. at 728.
(Castille, C.J., concurring). See Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 109. Other states' guidelines have
established specific times, places, warnings, publicity, safety precautions, and overall objec-
tive procedures. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987); State v. Loyd, 530
N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1995); Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174.
160. 2 CRIM. PRAc. MANUAL § 30:6 (West 2011).
161. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1039 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)
(internal quotes omitted)).
162. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d at 969.
163. Worthy, 903 A.2d at 580-81.
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guidelines, then cited the Superior Court's decision in Worthy.' 64
The Superior Court's decision in Worthy provided the consistent
alternative to the holding in In re J.A.K in finding that the sobrie-
ty checkpoint was unconstitutional because it did not comport
with established procedures governing operation of the road-
block. 165 The Superior court in Worthy found the decision to sus-
pend the checkpoint and resume the checkpoint was instead con-
trolled by the arbitrary discretion of the police officers, rather
than a prefixed, objective standard.166 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's reversal of that holding created a conflicting result and
worsened already deficient guidelines.
The facts of the 1997 Tennessee case of Downey are strikingly
similar to those of Worthy, yet the Tennessee court reached the
opposite and better conclusion. In both Worthy and Downey, offic-
ers stopped every motorist and, once traffic became congested, let
every motorist pass.1 67 The Downey court held that the roadblock
was unconstitutional because the roadblock was operated through
the officer's unfettered discretion. 168 Tennessee roadblocks must
be operated according to predetermined guidelines and adminis-
trative authority that reduces potential invasiveness. 169  Four
years after Downey, the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v.
Hicks1 70 did exactly what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Worthy should have done: complied with precedent and clarified it
for future courts to follow. The Hicks court gave further direction
by providing two facts critical to finding that the officers' discre-
tion was appropriately limited:
(1) the decision to set up the roadblock in the first instance
cannot have been made by the officer or officers actually es-
tablishing the checkpoint, and (2) the officers on the scene
cannot decide for themselves the procedures to be used in op-
erating the roadblock. 7 1
164. In re JAK., 908 A.2d at 327.
165. Worthy, 903 A.2d at 580-81.
166. Id.
167. Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 105.
168. Id. at 111.
169. Id. at 105.
170. 55 S.W.3d 515, 533 (Tenn. 2001).
171. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d at 533.
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Tennessee courts that later addressed the issue of constitutional
roadblocks were able to apply both of the courts' holdings effective-
ly to ensure a constitutional roadblock has occurred.172
In addition to the Tennessee courts, nearly every court address-
ing the issue of a constitutional roadblock has applied Brown's
balancing analysis.173 Those courts applying the balancing test
recognize that states have a significant and legitimate interest in
restricting drunk driving. 74 The effectiveness of roadblocks in
furthering that interest is a controversial issue amongst many
jurisdictions.1 75  The majority of states, such as Indiana in
Gerschoffer and Tennessee in Downey, recognized how critical a
factor the degree of discretion exercised by field officers is while
conducting a roadblock. 176 Many states, such as California, Iowa,
and Kansas already have developed guidelines that minimize in-
trusiveness and limit discretion specifying such things as the
time, place, safety measures, and notice. 77 Pennsylvania needs to
do the same.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in Tarbert resulted in a line of fractured opinions
from Pennsylvania courts dealing with the same issue of the con-
stitutionality of roadblocks. Cases like Worthy merely provide a
brace for the break in Pennsylvania courts, instead of providing an
opinion that will remedy the issue, so it could be applied effective-
ly in the future. It is well-established that "police procedure is
less threatening to [constitutional] values when the discretionary
authority of the police (and thus the risk of arbitrary action) is
kept at an absolute minimum." 178 Pennsylvania courts need to
adopt specific guidelines like those proscribed by the NHTSA and
IACP and applied by other jurisdictions like Tennessee that will
172. See State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505, 513 (Tenn. 2006); Hicks, 55 S.W.3d at 520.
173. See United States v. Regan, 218 F. App'x 902, 903 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Faulkner, 450 F.3d 466, 471 (9th Cir. 2006); Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 538 (5th
Cir. 2004); Beaman, 880 A.2d at 582; State v. Sigler, 687 S.E.2d 391, 400 (W. Va. 2009).
174. See Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 109; Regan, 218 F. App'x at 903; Faulkner, 450 F.3d at
471; Ainsworth, 382 F.3d at 538; Beaman, 880 A.2d at 582; Sigler, 687 S.E.2d at 400).
175. Id. at 109.
176. Gerschoffer, 763 N. E.2d at 968-69.
177. Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 109-10. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
447 (1990) (emphasizing the roadblock's operation under written guidelines regarding
actual operation, site selection, and publicity left nearly no discretion to on-site officers);
Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 (requiring a plan of specific limitations on the conduct of officers);
Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299; Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708; Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174.
178. Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 109.
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result in consistent implementation by law enforcement and later
courts that address this issue. By holding the exercise of discre-
tion by the officers was not unfettered and the roadblock constitu-
tional, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania improperly addressed
the issue and missed an ideal opportunity to establish guidelines
for Pennsylvania law enforcement and courts that will ensure a
safe, effective, and constitutional roadblock.
Ann Kaluzavich

